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On May 19, 1988, the Court of Appeals entered its decision 
affirming the trial court's order. Eugene L. Perry, Appellant 
in this matter, files this Petition for Rehearing. 
I. UTAH LAW REQUIRES THE COURT OF APPEALS TO VIEW THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT. 
Mr. Perry appealed the probate court's refusal to vacate 
its December 3, 1985 Order as being void for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The lower Court entered a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 156 167) and two Orders (R. 190-192; 293-294). 
There was never an evidentiary hearing, nor did the Court ever 
enter any findings of fact. Under these circumstances, the 
Court of Appeals, at a minimum, should not rely upon any 
disputed facts in reaching its conclusion. As the Supreme 
Court has stated: 
The right to resort to the courts for the 
adjudication of grievances and the 
settlement of disputes is a fundamental 
one. An indispensable requisite to 
fulfilling that responsibility is the 
determination of questions of fact upon 
which there is a disagreement. 
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 
P.2d 615, 616 (1966) (reversing bench trial judgment where 
findings not entered under U.R.C.P. Rule 52); emphasis added. 
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Moreover, under Rule 41(b), where the trial court dismisses an 
action without entering findings of fact, the Supreme Court has 
held that the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the appellant, Davis v. Payne & Day, 10 Utah 
2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960). See also Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. 
Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 P.2d 1019 (1970) (motion to dismiss 
judged on basis of whether any facts would support claim). The 
Court of Appeals has violated this fundamental principle in 
this case. 
A. The Probate Court did not find that the 
McLaughlins were Interested Persons. 
The Court's actions can, in addition, be 
defended as Kent McLaughlin is an interested 
person as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 75-1 
201(20) (1978), with full power to ask for 
affirmative relief from the court, as he has 
a $2,500 equitable lien in the decedent's 
home. He is also the legal and natural 
guardian of the children of the deceased, 
who are beneficiaries of the estate and 
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105, he may 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 
Opinion at 6, footnote 7. The lower court never entered any 
finding of fact to this effect. Both parties acknowledged that 
the "meaning [of the term 'interested person'] as it relates to 
particular persons may vary from time to time and must be 
determined according to the particular purposes of, and matters 
- 2 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
involved in, any proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(20) 
(1978); Respondent's Brief at 11-12; Appellant's Brief at 15-16. 
Where Mr. Perry disputes that Mr. McLaughlin is an 
"interested person" for purposes of the hearing, the Court 
should view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Perry. Davis, 348 P.2d at 338. That evidence shows (1) Mr. 
McLaughlin acted contrary to the position of his children 
(refused to waive his equitable lien — R. 55-56), (2) he never 
purported to act on their behalf (see e.g. the order prepared 
by counsel for McLaughlins which gave them unfettered ownership 
of the home and furnishings — R. 72-75), (3) his equitable 
lien would have been substantially higher but for the fact that 
it was reduced as an offset for failure to pay child support 
for these two children (R.50-53) and (4) his only interest as a 
creditor was insuring that he was paid his $2,500 equitable 
lien. As to this final point, the Court should note that (1) 
he was not a general creditor of the estate (R.50-53; Utah Code 
Arm. § 75-1-201(4) (1973); In Re Estate of Malliet, 649 P.2d 18 
(Utah 1982) (disputes over specific real property are not 
"claims" under the claims statutes); and (2) his interest in 
the Estate would not have been sufficient to allow him to 
demand that the personal representative post a bond. Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-605 (1985). Viewing the facts most favorably to 
Mr. Perry, Mr. McLaughlin would be an interested person for 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purposes of objecting to the waiver of his equitable lien, but 
not for the purpose of bidding on the home or the furnishings. 
Nothing about his equitable lien would extend his interest to 
acquiring estate property. In any event, the court below made 
no factual finding that Mr. McLaughlin was an interested 
person; it is improper for this court to rule on this point as 
if it were reviewing findings of fact after an evidentiary 
hearing. LeGrand Johnson Corporation, 420 P.2d at 616. 
B. The Lower Court has Never Ruled that the 
McLauohlings are Entitled to the Disputed Furnishings. 
The Court states that Judge Hanson "also ruled that the 
December 3, 1985 Order entitled the McLaughlins to the 
furnishings even though they did not purchase the home.'1 
Opinion at 3. This is contrary to the record. 
The Order to Show Cause was heard by Judge Rigtrup. R. 
131-132. Mr. Perry unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate all 
of the proceedings before Judge Hanson. R. 109-114, 241. As a 
result, this issue was never presented to Judge Hanson. See 
Record generally; R. 220-221. 
This is shown by what took place after the Court1s orally 
denied the Rule 59(a) motion at the April 7, 1986 hearing. The 
McLaughlins submitted a proposed order. R. 295-296. Mr. Perry 
objected and submitted a proposed order. R. 289-290; 293-294. 
- 4 -
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While there were some stylistic differences between the orders, 
the only substantive difference was the inclusion in the 
McLaughlins1 order of the following language: "the Court 
. . • determined . . . that the McLaughlin's [sic] are legally 
(entitled to the personal property in question . . •.M 
R. 295-296, The Court signed Mr. Perry's order. R. 293-294. 
Thus, the Court recognized that it would be a violation of Mr. 
Perry's due process rights to rule on that matter when it was 
pending before another judge and in view of the fact that Mr. 
Perry had never presented any argument to Judge Hanson on the 
merits of that issue. R. 220-221. 
The Court should excise this statement from the opinion to 
insure that there is no future rejudice to Mr. Perry on the 
merits of the underlying dispute. 
C. Mr. McLaughlin Did Not Object to the Petition to 
Sell the Home and Furniture. 
"Prior to the hearing, Kent McLaughlin filed an objection 
to Perry's petition to sell the family home to the Arnauds." 
Opinion at 1-2. Mr. McLaughlin never objected to the sale of 
the home; he objected only to the waiver of his equitable lien 
in the home. R. 55-56. 
- 5 -
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II- THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS FAILED TO APPLY UTAH LAW ON 
THE ISSUE RAISED. 
Mr. Perry has raised the question of whether, under Utah 
law, the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant 
affirmative relief to a person who did not qualify as an 
interested person under the probate code. The Court's decision 
does not address either of the Utah cases cited by Mr. Perry in 
support of his claim. Matter of Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d 
165 (Utah 1983); Matter of Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1987). 
In Estate of Anderson, the Supreme Court ruled that an 
order invalidating a protected person's will and enjoining the 
execution of a new will without prior court approval was void 
because the court "exceeded its powers of adjudication." 
Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168. Notwithstanding the 
general grant of power to the probate court under Section 
75-1-302 ("the court has jurisdiction over all subject matter 
relating to: . . . incapacitated persons . . . " ) , the Supreme 
Court analyzed the issue in terms of Section 75-5-408 — the 
section which specifically sets forth the powers of the probate 
court in conservatorship matters. Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-408 
(1978). Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168. Because that 
section excepts from the Court's power the "power to make a 
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will," the Court ruled that invalidation of an existing will 
prior to death and enjoining the execution of a will without 
court approval exceeded the court's powers of adjudication. 
Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168-69. 
Section 75-1-302 gives the probate court the same general 
jurisdiction over estates as it does over incapacitated 
persons. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302 (1978). In the case at 
bar, the Court's analysis started and finished with Section 
75-1-302. Opinion at 5. The Court did not analyze the probate 
statute comparable to Section 75-5-408. Section 75-3-105 is 
entitled: "Proceedings affecting devolution and administration 
— jurisdiction of subject matter." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 
(1978). The statute then provides "[plersons interested in 
decedent's estates may . . . petition the court for orders 
. . .." The Supreme Court has quite logically equated the 
people who have standing to seek court orders in probate 
matters to be those who are "interested persons" as defined by 
Section 75-1-201 (20). Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d at 805. 
Thus, the probate court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the petitions of non-interested persons. 
The Court relied heavily on Mr. Perry's actions at the 
hearing, his involvement with the preparation of the challenged 
order and the fact that it was he that petitioned the court. 
- 7 -
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Opinion at 2, 5 and 6, Estate of Anderson also shows that this 
reliance is misplaced. In Estate of Anderson, the party 
seeking to avoid the order stipulated its entry into the 
record. Moreover, a separate part of the order in that case 
was found to be valid. Thus, the Anderson court had 
jurisdiction generally to entertain the petition of the 
parties; it violated its jurisdictional authority only when 
part of the order entered exceeded the court's statutory 
grant. Estate of Anderson, 671 P.2d at 168-169. In a similar 
fashion, the probate court in this case had authority to hear 
the petition of Mr. Perry, but it "exceeded in powers of 
adjudication" when it granted relief to the McLaughlins. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS VIOLATED FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN ANALYZING THE REPEAL OF SECTION 
75-3-710(3) . 
The Court of Appeals found no significance in the repeal of 
Section 75-3-710(3) because it was "duplicative of the other 
broader authority granted to the court under the" probate 
code. Opinion at 6. "It is an elementary rule of construction 
that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause 
and sentence of a statute." Sutherland Stat. Const. § 46.06 
(4th Ed. 1984) (citations omitted; emphasis added). As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated: "We construe a statute on the 
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assumption that each term is used advisedly and that the intent 
of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the 
context and structure in which it is placed." Ward v. 
Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984). The Court's 
treatment of Section 75-3-710(3) ignored both the common law's 
"elementary rule of construction" and the Utah Supreme Court's 
assumption. Mr. Perry carefully analyzed the relevant sections 
of the Uniform Probate Code, the accompanying joint editorial 
board comments of the Uniform Laws Commissioners (whose 
addition to the Utah Code Annotated was authorized by the 
Legislature) and the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of 
Peterson. Appellant's Brief at 19-24. His analysis shows 
Section 75-3-710(3), prior to its repeal, was unique as the 
only section of the Utah Uniform Probate Code which permitted a 
non interested person to seek affirmative relief from the 
probate court. By its actions in 1977, the Legislature's 
intended this result. This is shown by the fact that Section 
75-3-710(3) was added to the Uniform Probate Code by the Utah 
Legislature (Compare Uniform Probate Code § 3-711) and by the 
fact that Section 75-3-710(3) is consistent with how Utah law 
treated sales of estate property prior to the enactment of the 
Uniform Probate Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-10-1 et al.; in 
particular § 75-10-15 (repealed 1977). 
- 9 -
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The Court's concern that a self interested personal 
representative "could prevent the court, in selling property, 
from maximizing the estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries 
and creditors" (Opinion at 6) is misguided. A self interested 
personal representative can sell property without court order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710 (1983). The sale could only then be 
attacked by an interested person who would have to show that 
there was a "substantial conflict of interest" to void the 
sale. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 (1978); § 75-3-712 (1978). 
The interested person could also seek damages if the personal 
representative breached its duties. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-711 
(1978). The Court's opinion is written from the perspective of 
a shepherd caring for the flock; not from the prospective 
intended by the Uniform Probate Code: 
This section and others in Chapter 3 describe a system 
of administration of decedents' estates which gives 
interested persons control of whether matters relating 
to estates will become occasions for judicial orders. 
. . . Nothing except self-interest will compel resort 
to the judge. When resort to the judge is necessary 
or desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain 
protection, the scope of the proceeding if not 
otherwise prescribed by the Code is framed bv the 
petition. 
Editorial Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106; emphasis 
added. 
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The probate court acts only at the direction of interested 
persons for their benefit and protection. If interested 
persons choose not to contest the actions of the personal 
representative, the probate court has no jurisdiction to act on 
its own. 
Even if the Court affirms its ruling, it would be a far 
better result to limit that ruling to the concept that Mr. 
Perry's complaint goes to a procedural defect rather than a 
jurisdictional error. Opinion 3-5. As written, the Court's 
opinion unfortunately and unnecessarily tramples the underlying 
philosophy of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
If the Court agrees that Mr. McLaughlin must be an 
interested person for purposes of the hearing on November 7, 
1985 and the subsequent Order of December 3, 1985, Mr. Perry 
requests that the Court remand the case to the district court 
for further proceedings to determine by an evidentiary hearing 
whether Mr. McLaughlin is an "interested person." 
1
 Mr. Perry agrees with the Court's point made during oral 
argument that, assuming his position is correct, if either of 
the McLaughlins is an "interested person," the probate court 
had jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief to both of them. 
- 11 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
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Attorney for Respondents 
Kent and Carol McLaughlin 
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